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Abstract
In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual’s decision to
volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual
resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering
by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that
the interaction between this information and one’s private information makes it more
likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her
peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Cen-
sus 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September
supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics,
and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We addi-
tionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias
and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighborhoods, which
allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as
well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we
employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.
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1 Introduction
Economists have become increasingly interested in determining what motivates individuals
to engage in volunteer work and thereby participate in what has been termed the “unpaid
labor” sector (see Freeman[1], Govekar and Govekar [2], and Greisling [30] as a few examples).
In contrast to earlier research, which considered unpaid labor to be indistinguishable from
leisure, it has become increasingly common to model volunteering and related activities as
a decision distinct in type and nature from the more general choice of engaging in leisure.
Problems have also been empirically documented, primarily in small experiment settings,
with an explanation of the choice to volunteer employing a purely public goods framework.
A particular challenge comes from mounting evidence that, although individuals often engage
in activities which are costly to themselves and, seemingly, primarily beneficial to others, the
presence of individuals with other-regarding preferences does not suffice as an explanation. In
the modern literature, this has been interpreted as suggesting the presence of an underlying
private value from volunteering. This private value provides an individual motivation to
acquire what has been termed variously “a warm glow,” “prestige,” or “self-worth.”
Broadening the set of motives that influence pro-social behavior has led economists to
ask how these motives interact with one another and with the underlying economic envi-
ronment.1 In some situations, the intrinsic motives of individuals seem to play such a vital
role that providing rewards and punishments to foster pro-social conduct can actually crowd
out individual contributions, the result being a reduction in both the size and number of
individual contributions. In other settings, however, social pressure and norms favoring pro-
social deeds and punishing selfish acts do seem to achieve their stated goal without causing
crowd-out. To complicate matters further, most people value the perceived opinion others
have of them (sometimes referred to as “self-image”), while also striving to maintain at
least a minimal amount of consistency between their actions and their core values or beliefs.
Clearly, the multi-dimensionality in how motivations interact with one other and with the
economic environment dictate the need for additional research in this fairly complex arena.
Establishing a clear understanding of the aforementioned relationships is also funda-
mentally important to the task of identifying the personal and communal determinants of
pro-social behavior, as well as comparing their relative strengths. Unfortunately, the actions
and interactions of these drivers are contingent not only upon the context of the pro-social
behavior in question (for example, contributing towards a public good, or volunteering one’s
labor or other resources, etc.) but also upon the specific social group from which they em-
anate and within which they operate. An examination of the effect the social group itself
1See the introduction of Benabou and Tirole [12] for a review of these issues.
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exerts upon the pro-social conduct of its members is, therefore, equally imperative. This
goal is the primary focus of our analysis within the context of engaging in volunteer work.
In the present study, we theoretically outline and empirically investigate an alternative
explanation for the individual volunteering decision. Volunteering, as we see it, is an activity
imposing costs on the individual who volunteers, but primarily benefiting other members
of the community. In order to be observed at sufficiently high levels within a community,
members of the community must successfully coordinate in a way that makes it more likely for
any particular individual to contribute given higher expected levels of contributions by others
in the community. We formalize this view using a model in which a group of agents each
individually and simultaneously face the decision of whether or not to make a contribution
to a public good. The need for coordination arises because the public good production
technology requires a minimum amount of contributions for the good to be supplied. The
usual economic problem with decentralized provision of public goods stems from the fact
that, from the individual perspective, contributing does not make sense if that individual
expects either too few, or more than enough, total contributions by other members in his or
her community.
Despite this public good dilemma, we find that the presence of uncertainty regarding the
required minimum amount of contributions suffices to support a symmetric pure-strategyε-
Nash equilibrium in which the public good is supplied with positive probability. Perhaps
even more interestingly, in this equilibrium the total number of individual contributions is
positively correlated with the typical agent’s decision to contribute. More precisely, the
higher the number of contributions within her community, the more probable it is that
any individual will choose to contribute. We see that, within the social coordination that
generically takes place in our model, the expected number of individual contributions plays
a crucial role. In conjunction with her private information, it allows the typical agent to
form her posterior belief regarding the likelihood of provision of the public good. This
in turn determines her expected marginal rate of substitution between contributing and
not contributing. Since one’s net benefit from contributing is not a priori known, beliefs
about the total number of contributions are of course fundamentally important. In our
model, an individual’s net benefit from contributing depends on the actual desirability of
the public good in question. This desirability is itself a function of a variety of factors
including the degree of efficiency in the provision of the good (depicted in our setting by
the required minimum amount of contributions), the good’s value relative to other private
or public projects that may be funded by individual resources, and the economic value of
these resources, to name just a few examples. These are factors that our simple theoretical
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model fails to capture explicitly and this necessitates including a more general empirical
investigation.
The empirical section focuses on the interaction between the characteristics of the com-
munity in which an individual resides and her decision to volunteer for a public good. The
positive relationship between an individual’s propensity to volunteer and the total amount
of contributions in the community is clearly supported by the data. Our empirical results
are robust to various (empirical) modeling specifications, and the inclusion or exclusion of
community and individual control factors. We address the issue of reflection bias and en-
dogeneity caused by selective sorting of individuals by neighborhood through the use of an
innovative instrumental variables strategy allowing for a causal interpretation of our results.
Our instruments make use of both previous levels of volunteering in the area to instrument
for current levels, as well as instrumenting nonreligious individual volunteering with average
levels of religious volunteering in the community. Taken together, in the main analysis as
well as in our various robustness checks, our findings are clearly consistent with our theoret-
ical premise. We take this as evidence for the consistency of results between our theoretical
model and a more general and less stylized empirical reality.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first within the realm of the volunteering and
public goods literature to use an informational perspective to model the interaction between
an individual’s propensity to engage in pro-social behavior and the propensity to engage in
pro-social behavior of others in the individual’s community. Our theoretical framework is
very similar to a standard structure used when discussing speculative exchange-rate attacks
and bank- or asset-runs. One key difference between our model and the aforementioned
models in the speculative exchange-rate and bank- or asset-runs literature relates to how
the actions of others affect an individual’s payoffs. In the aforementioned literature, the
actions of others only affect one’s payoff indirectly by carrying information regarding the
underlying state of the world. In contrast, in our structure the actions of others also matter
directly, since sufficient contributions by others in the community to provide the public good
mean that an individual should choose not to contribute. Empirically, our use of Census
data linked to CPS data allows us to employ the largest and most representative sample of
recent volunteering which is presently available. It is also true that our use of an innovative
instrumental variables structure and clear statistical testing allow for a more rigorous and
causal interpretation than previously existing in the empirical literature in this area. In this
sense, the novelty of our investigation lies in the extent to which it is comprehensive, causally
interpretable, and allows us to be confident in our results.2
2See Brudney and Gazley [16] for a discussion of the problems that plague data-gathering regarding
volunteering.
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The remainder of our analysis is organized as follows: We summarize and review the
relevant literature in Section 2. We outline our theoretical analysis and its implications
in Section 3. For the empirical portion of our analysis, we present and discuss our data,
structure and results in Section 4. We summarize our results and overarching conclusions in
Section 5.
2 Related Literature
In the current analysis, we chose the model and empirical structure with the goal of un-
derstanding how the volunteering of others affects an individual’s propensity to volunteer.
Before we can fully convey the implications of our analysis, however, we must first place it
in context of a discussion of the literature on individually-driven but socially-affected moti-
vations for individual volunteering.3 The economics literature in this area has made some
headway, and now offers some fairly established theories regarding why individuals volunteer
in a general sense, as well as why they volunteer specifically in the provision of public goods.
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Traditionally, economists considered volunteering to be a purely public good and, as such,
noted that it should be subject to the problem of the commons. Namely, an individual’s
propensity to volunteer should decrease as the number of contributions by others increase.
For this same reason, private contributions should be crowded out by governmental provision
of a public good (see for instance Bergstrom et al. [11] for early work on this topic).
The empirical evidence to date has not borne out this simplistic view of the act of
volunteering as a purely public good. Specifically, neither of the previous assertions regarding
the problem of the commons and its results for the provision of public goods has been
3We do not address the issue of prescribed volunteering, such as service learning requirements often
instituted in junior high or high school. This area of analysis is currently absent in the existing literature
and would serve as an interesting and useful extension to the current work. For an introduction to service
learning see for example McGoldrick et al. [35]
4We note as we begin this discussion that many of the motivations to be discussed could easily refer
to donations of one’s material resources to charity, however, they could equally well relate to donations
of one’s time or effort to a common good or cause. This is not particularly surprising, since volunteering
has been analyzed as being a substitute for, and also a complement to charitable monetary contributions.
Nonetheless, some of the reasons an individual might volunteer his or her time are quite distinct from those
dictating the choice to give charitable monetary contributions. For instance, she may want to volunteer for
certain tasks in order to increase her human capital by either providing her with skills complementing those
she uses while employed in the paid labor sector or, more importantly, by providing her with contacts and
work experience during times of unemployment. This reason is clearly unique to volunteering of one’s time
rather than monetary contributions. Other reasons given for volunteering, in contrast to reasons given for
monetary contributions, are increases in self-worth through higher levels of productivity and decreases in
social isolation-particularly after retirement.
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demonstrated in a consistent fashion. Recent empirical evidence even shows that, consistent
with this paper’s structure, albeit using small experimental studies, there may in fact be
a positive relationship between the number of individual contributions and an individual’s
propensity to contribute. Indeed, the well-known studies in Andreoni [10] and [8] document
using small experimental studies, that the provision of a public good appears to increase
with the concurrent level of giving in the community, and that private contributions are
not necessarily crowded out by governmental provision of the public good. One explanation
given for this type of result, albeit with respect to a very specific kind of public good, is
offered by Bilodeau and Slivinski [13]. In their work, these authors use the premise that
private valuations of the public good may differ across individual members of a group.
A more general possibility which supports these initial empirical results, however, is the
possibility that individuals are in fact impure altruists. In this view, the individual con-
tributing to the public good not only benefits from using the public good which is ultimately
created, but the very act of contributing to the public good offers a private benefit. Several
of these additional private valuations are discussed in the sense of individuals gaining a
“warm-glow,” “prestige” or “moral superiority” from the very act of contributing to a public
good.
The “warm glow” characterization of volunteering is fairly straightforward in assigning
individuals a private benefit from the act of volunteering, but it is not very complex in how or
why this warm-glow is formed or in relating the benefits as intrinsically socially determined
[6]-[9]. In contrast, some scholars take the approach that individuals contribute (money)
because they would like to be considered “philanthropists” and, thereby, gain prestige within
their community [31] [28]. The number of other contributors as well as the timing of when
an individual contributes relative to others in the community will also affect the private
prestige benefit. Higher contributions by others render the cause for which the individual is
called upon to donate more prestigious, and, thereby, increase the possible level of prestige
an individual can gain by contributing. Additionally, being an early contributor would gain
the individual more prestige and attention than falling within the dense ranks of later, less-
visible donors.5 Finally, in the “moral stance” theory, individuals are viewed as volunteering
because they believe free-riding to be morally wrong and, consequently, feel an obligation
to contribute to the public good. In this structure, put forth by Sugden [46], donations
to the public good offer individuals the socially-determined, private benefit of establishing
themselves as moral human beings. It is also true that each of these explanations is related
to the feeling of “making a difference,” which seems to be linked to the number of others
5For a general discussion on this topic, see Carman [18] as well as Knox [33]. See also Andreoni [6] for
an excellent introduction to the issues and research on volunteering and charitable giving.
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who acting in a similar fashion (Francois [26]). The above overview of the possible reasons
for private valuations within the very act of contributing highlights the importance of social
influences in establishing private valuations.6 We next discuss a variation which is more
closely related theoretically to the form employed in the present analysis.
The signaling structure examines the social context of volunteering in terms of the infor-
mation conveyed by the volunteering of others. For instance, instead of being motivated to
gain prestige by early contributions to a charity, individuals may instead choose to be later
contributors in order to learn more about the intrinsic value of the public good in question.
In this context, later contributions make sense since previously observed donations can serve
as a signal regarding the intrinsic value of the public good. This type of signaling effect was
documented experimentally by Potters et al. [42] who found that sequential contributions
to a public good can be useful when there is uncertainty regarding its true value. More
precisely, this study suggests that agents who are informed regarding the underlying quality
of the public good should make their decisions first so as to provide the uninformed agents
with a signal (see also Andreoni [6] for a related finding). This type of signaling framework
also explains why charities which tend to announce early contributions along with the re-
lated amounts of these contributions generally receive more total contributions than charities
which do not make these types of announcements (Vesterlund [51]).
In our model, we abstract from an explicit account of intrinsic private valuations in order
to instead focus on the underlying social interactions in the decision to volunteer. Our
theoretical setup is very similar to the one in Nirei et al. [41]. Specifically, our agents also
employ Bayesian learning and, in equilibrium, choose whether or not to take an action based
on the information conveyed by their own private signal as well as the expected actions of
others. The equilibrium strategy exhibits complementarity, since each agent is more likely
to contribute when the aggregate number of contributions in the community is larger. As
a result, some fraction of the agents ends up synchronizing their actions. The size of this
fraction is determined by the realization of the agents’ signals via a threshold-based switching
strategy, as in Morris and Shin [38]. Here, however, the threshold in question is affected by
the actions of others because these actions affect one’s expected payoff. In fact, one of the
goods being public in the present context, the underlying complementarities are not only
strategic, but also ones that affect the payoffs directly (which makes the analysis rather more
involved).
6For a comprehensive overview of the economic relations within social interactions, see Blume et al. [15].
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3 The Model
In what follows, we consider a community ofN ∈ N∗ individuals (indexed by n = 1, . . . , N) in
which a public good may be provided according to the production technology h0 : R+ 7→ R+
given by
h0 (X) =
{
0 if X < eθ0
h (X) if X ≥ eθ0
for some function h : R++ 7→ R+. Here, X denotes a single input which must be available
in at least some minimum quantity for the public good to be produced. To keep things
analytically tractable, we take this minimum to be log-normally distributed: θ0 ∼ N (ϑ, σ
2).
Regarding h, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption A.1 The function h : R++ 7→ R+ is twice continuously differentiable, and
satisfies
• (i) limX→0 h (X) = 0
• (ii) Strict monotonicity: h′ (X) > 0 ∀X ∈ R+
• (iii) Convexity: h′′ (X) ≥ 0 ∀X ∈ R+
The input in question results from the collective contributions of the community members
who all have identical von-Neumann Morgenstern preferences for consumption of the public
good and all other commodities, and an endowment w units of private consumption. The
individual preferences are given by the Bernoulli utility function U : R2+ 7→ R, which satisfies
the following conditions:
Assumption A.2
• (i) The function U is strictly increasing in either argument on R2+
• (ii) As the input to the public good production process becomes arbitrarily large, the
marginal rate of substitution between private and public consumption tends to a limit
which is dominated by that of the marginal physical product of X
lim
X→+∞
[
h′ (X)−
U1 (y, h (X))
U2 (y, h (X))
]
> 0 ∀y ∈ (0, w)
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• (iii) As the input to the public good production process becomes arbitrarily large,
the typical agent views private and public consumption as (weak) substitutes, and is
(weakly) risk-loving with respect to the latter
lim
X→+∞
U12 (y, h (X)) ≤ 0 ≤ lim
X→+∞
U22 (y, h (X)) ∀y ∈ (0, w)
These restrictions refer to a setting in which the public good production technology exhibits
non-decreasing marginal product and, at least in the limit (for a sufficiently large amount of
the public good), the marginal rate of substitution between private and public consumption
becomes non-increasing with respect to the latter. To fix ideas, suppose that the individ-
ual members of a community are called upon to volunteer their time and effort in order to
clean up some commons (a neighborhood park, a beach, etc.), to improve the quality and
effectiveness of the educational, cultural, or recreational activities their offspring enjoy at
a local center (school, summer camp, church, etc.), or to enhance the prospects of a socio-
political or cultural campaign. In each of these cases, we focus on the interaction between
the public good in question and a private one which is a substitute, at least as long as the
public good is available in large enough quantities. For instance, when the latter condition
represents a public park that is sufficiently large, beautiful, accessible, and well-maintained,
our theoretical platform views one’s private garden within a nearby property as an amenity
that becomes increasingly dispensable. Similarly, when the frame of reference is a grassroots
socio-political movement, we restrict our attention to those characteristics that render par-
ticipation rates as an input with increasing marginal product. For instance, the movement
can lead to significant voter registration for a political party locally, which in turn may help
at the state and national levels.
In each of these contexts, we assume that the members of the community are called upon
to decide individually but simultaneously whether or not to make a fixed contribution of x
units of private consumption towards the production of the public good. When the typical
agent is called upon to act, but prior to her actual choice, she receives some information about
the minimum amount of the productive input the available technology requires. Specifically,
she observes the private signal θn = θ0+ ǫn where the error terms are i.i.d. across the agents,
according to the normal distribution N (0, σ2ǫ ) truncated at the interval [−c, c], for some
given c ∈ R∗, and such that Cov (θ0, ǫn) = 0.7
7In other words, the probability density function of the private signal is given by
φ
(
θn−θ0√
σ2
ǫ
)
√
σ2
ǫ
[
Φ
(
c√
σ2
ǫ
)
−Φ
(
−c√
σ2
ǫ
)]
where Φ (·) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
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The Equilibrium
Obviously, in this simple setting, the typical individual who expects exactly k other agents
to contribute will choose to make her own contribution if and only if she believes it is pivotal
for the production of the public good. More precisely, given her signal θn and her belief that
k other individuals will contribute, her payoff is given by
Pr
[
eθ ≤ (k + 1) x|θn, k
]
U (wn − x, h ((k + 1) x))+Pr
[
eθ > (k + 1) x|θn, k
]
U (wn − x, 0)
if she contributes and
Pr
[
eθ ≤ kx|θn, k
]
U (wn, h (kx)) + Pr
[
eθ > kx|θn, k
]
U (wn, 0)
if she doesn’t. She will contribute, therefore, if and only if
0 ≤ Pr
[
eθ ≤ kx|θn, k
]
[U (wn − x, h ((k + 1) x))− U (wn, h (kx))] (1)
+ Pr
[
eθ > kx|θn, k
]
[U (wn − x, 0)− U (wn, 0)]
+ Pr
[
kx ≤ eθ ≤ (k + 1) x|θn, k
]
[U (wn − x, h ((k + 1) x))− U (wn − x, 0)]
Equivalently (recall Assumptions A.1(ii) and A.2(i)), if and only if
V (θn, k) + f (θn, k) ≥ 0
where
V (θn, k) =
[U (wn − x, h ((k + 1) x))− U (wn, h (kx))]
[U (wn − x, h ((k + 1) x))− U (wn − x, 0)]
+
Pr
[
eθ > kx|θn, k
]
Pr [eθ ≤ kx|θn, k]
(
U (wn − x, 0)− U (wn, 0)
U (wn − x, h ((k + 1) x))− U (wn − x, 0)
)
and
f (θn, k) =
Pr
[
kx ≤ eθ ≤ (k + 1) x|θn, k
]
Pr [eθ ≤ kx|θn, k]
To investigate the typical agent’s strategic behavior, we restrict our attention to obtaining
a symmetric ε-Nash equilibrium in which she follows the strategy of contributing if and only
if her private signal realization does not exceed a critical value. Of course, the cutoff in
question cannot help but depend on the surmised number of individual contributions so
that, if a total of k agents make contributions in equilibrium, it is because their signals and
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only their signals fell below some value θ (k). It follows, therefore, that we have to verify
the following premise: given her realization θn and her belief that exactly k other agents will
contribute, it is optimal for the typical agent to contribute if and only if θn ≤ θ (k), as long
as every other player follows the same strategy.
We do this by reasoning in steps. First, we show that the premise in question is valid in
the limit, for a sufficiently large number of contributions. Then, we establish that, also in
the limit, the cut-off function θ (·) is monotone. Given, however, that either of the previous
steps is valid for an arbitrary fixed size x of individual contributions, the problem at hand
can be transformed to one in which θ (·) is monotone over all possible values of k. As a
result, the desired equilibrium exists even without the k → +∞ qualification.
Regarding the first step of the reasoning outlined above, it turns out that we may ignore
the last term on the right-hand side of (1) without loss of generality. Intuitively, this term
evaluates the net welfare gain of a typical contributor when the public good gets produced.
The model weights it, however, according to the likelihood that she is pivotal for the pro-
duction process, an event which becomes null in the limit as the number of contributions
grows.
Proposition 1 Let the variables θn, θ0 and the quantity V (θn, k) be defined as above. The
following are equivalent
• For a given ε > 0, there exists k1 ∈ N s.t. V (θn, k) + f (θn, k) ≥ −ε ∀k ∈ N : k ≥ k1
• For a given ε > 0, there exists k2 ∈ N s.t. V (θn, k) ≥ −ε ∀k ∈ N : k ≥ k2
In the limit, therefore, we may restrict attention to an ε-Nash equilibrium in which the
typical individual contributes when she expects k other members of her community to do
so if and only if V (θn, k) ≥ −ε. And this limit is independent of the individual’s private
signal.8 Moreover, given the following result
Lemma 1 Let
∆U (w, x, k) = U (w − x, h ((k + 1) x))− U (w, h (kx))
Under assumptions A.1(ii) and A.2(ii), we have limk→+∞∆U (w, x, k) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
8Indeed, neitherk1nor k2depend on the realization θn
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there will be some k3 ∈ N with k3 ≥ max [k1, k2] such that, for all k ≥ k3, the decision rule
in question may be re-written as follows
Pr
[
eθ ≤ kx|θn, k
]
Pr [eθ > kx|θn, k]
≥
U (wn, 0)− U (wn − x, 0)
∆U (w, x, k) + ε [U (wn − x, h ((k + 1) x))− U (wn − x, 0)]
(2)
Let us turn now to the left-hand side of (2). On the one hand, Bayes’ rule gives
Pr
[
eθ0 ≤ kx|θn, k
]
Pr [eθ0 > kx|θn, k]
=
Pr
[
eθ0 ≤ kx, θn, k
]
Pr [eθ0 > kx, θn, k]
=
Pr
[
k|θn, e
θ0 ≤ kx
]
Pr
[
θn, e
θ0 ≤ kx
]
Pr [k|θn, eθ0 > kx] Pr [θn, eθ0 > kx]
while, on the other hand, the hypothesized typical response rule requires that
Pr
[
k|θn, e
θ0 ≤ kx
]
= F (θ (k) , k)N−k−1 F˜ (θ (k) , k)k
where we deploy the following likelihoods
F (θ (k) , k) = Pr
[
θn > θ (k) |e
θ0 ≤ kx
]
F˜ (θ (k) , k) = Pr
[
θn ≤ θ (k) |e
θ0 ≤ kx
]
= Pr
[
eθ0 ≤ kx
]
− F (θ (k) , k)
And similarly,
Pr
[
k|θn, e
θ0 > kx
]
= G (θ (k) , k)N−k−1 G˜ (θ (k) , k)k
where
G (θ (k) , k) = Pr
[
θn > θ (k) |e
θ0 > kx
]
G˜ (θ (k) , k) = Pr
[
θn ≤ θ (k) |e
θ0 > kx
]
= 1− Pr
[
eθ0 ≤ kx
]
−G (θ (k) , k)
It then follows that the left-hand side of (2) can be expressed more succinctly as
Pr
[
eθ0 ≤ kx, θn, k
]
Pr [eθ0 > kx, θn, k]
= δ (θn, k)A (θ (k) , k)
N−k−1B (θ (k) , k)k
with
A (θ (k) , k) =
F (θ (k) , k)
G (θ (k) , k)
B (θ (k) , k) =
F˜ (θ (k) , k)
G˜ (θ (k) , k)
δ (θn, k) =
Pr
[
θn, e
θ0 ≤ kx
]
Pr [θn, eθ0 > kx]
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To verify the typical agent’s best response as dictating that she contributes if and only
if her signal does not exceed the cutoff value, it suffices to show that, other things being
equal in terms of k and the other players’ signal realizations {θ1, . . . , θn−1, θn+1, . . . , θN}, the
likelihood ratio
Pr[eθ0≤kx,θn,k]
Pr[eθ0>kx,θn,k]
is decreasing in θn. Yet, the latter variable affects this ratio
only through the likelihood ratio δ (θn, k). It is enough, therefore, to show that δ (θn, k) is
decreasing in θn. Which is indeed the case, in fact, for any given k ∈ N.
Proposition 2 Let kx ∈ R++ be fixed and θn, θ0 be defined as above. The likelihood ratio
δ (θn, k) =
Pr
[
θn, e
θ0 ≤ kx
]
Pr [θn, eθ0 > kx]
is such that δ1 (θn, k) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Next, we need to identify the cutoff schedule θ : N 7→ R and show that the strategic rule
in question supports an ε-Nash equilibrium. Adopting the usual convention that, if an agent
is indifferent between making a contribution or not, she will choose to contribute, θ (·) gets
defined implicitly by the binding version of (2) for θn = θ (k). Formally,
U (wn, 0)− U (wn − x, 0)
∆U (w, x, k) + ε [U (wn − x, h ((k + 1) x))− U (wn − x, 0)]
(3)
= δ (θ (k) , k)A (θ (k) , k)N−k−1B (θ (k) , k)k
Recall now that we are seeking a symmetric ε-Nash equilibrium under the strategic
premise that each player who expects k contributions from the rest of the community will
herself contribute if and only if her private signal does not exceed the value θ (k). Since
this scenario entails by construction each and every agent playing her best-response to the
strategic profile of the rest of the community, to obtain an equilibrium, it remains only to
ensure that the players’ beliefs about the total number of contributions are correct. We need
to show, therefore, that, for any realization of signals θ˜ = (θ1, . . . , θN) ∈ R
N , there exists
some k
θ˜
∈ N such that exactly k
θ˜
∈ N entries from θ˜ do not exceed the cutoff θ
(
k
θ˜
)
. To this
end, we will make use of another result and a well-known fixed point theorem.
Proposition 3 Let the mapping θ : N 7→ R be defined implicitly by (3). Then, ∃k4 ∈ N s.t.
the restricted mapping θ : N \ {1, . . . , k4} 7→ R is strictly increasing.
Proof. See Appendix A.
12
To fix ideas, our analysis thus far ensures that, for k5 = max {ki}
4
i=1 and any signal
realization θ˜, the symmetric strategy profile in which each individual contributes to the
public good if and only if her private signal does not exceed the cut-off θ (k) consists of
best-responses, while the restriction of the mapping θ to the set N\{1, . . . , k5} is guaranteed
to be strictly increasing. Moreover, we established these facts for arbitrary fixed, size x
of individual contributions. Hence, to obtain monotonicity over the entire domain N, we
may consider a change of variables x′ = k5x. Under this transformation, since (n+ 1) x′ =
(n+ 1) k5x ≥ k5x for all n ∈ N, the entire cutoff mapping θ : N 7→ R becomes strictly
increasing.
We may then define the correspondence Θ : RN × {0, . . . , N} 7→ {0, . . . , N} so that, for
any signal realization θ˜, Θ
(
θ˜, k
)
is the number of entries in θ˜ that do not exceed θ (k).
Obviously, since θ (·) is increasing, so is Θ
(
θ˜, ·
)
which, in turn, must have a fixed point
by Tarski’s theorem (see Tarski [47]). For any given θ˜, therefore, there will indeed be some
k
θ˜
∈ {0, . . . , N} such that exactly k
θ˜
signals are not larger than θ
(
k
θ˜
)
. Put differently, there
will indeed be an equilibrium, for every realization of signals.
We are finally in a position to conclude our theoretical investigation by pointing out our
most important implication of the equilibrium under examination. Namely, that the cutoff
mapping θ (·) being strictly increasing necessitates an ex-ante probability of typical contri-
bution that is strictly increasing in the total number of contributions across the community.
Indeed, the probability in question is given by
Pr [θn ≤ θ (k)] = Pr
[
θn ≤ θ (k) , e
θ0 ≤ kx
]
+ Pr
[
θn ≤ θ (k) , e
θ0 > kx
]
=
ˆ θ(k)
θ0−c
ˆ ln kx
−∞
e
−
(
(θn−θ0)
2
2σ2ǫ
+
(θ0−ϑ)
2
2σ2
)
dθ0dθn
+
ˆ θ(k)
θ0−c
ˆ +∞
ln kx
e
−
(
(θn−θ0)
2
2σ2ǫ
+
(θ0−ϑ)
2
2σ2
)
dθ0dθn
=
ˆ θ(k)
θ0−c
ˆ +∞
−∞
e
−
(
(θn−θ0)
2
2σ2ǫ
+
(θ0−ϑ)
2
2σ2
)
dθ0dθn
=
ˆ +∞
−∞
(ˆ θ(k)
θ0−c
e
−
(
(θn−θ0)
2
2σ2ǫ
+
(θ0−ϑ)
2
2σ2
)
dθn
)
dθ0
and the inner-integral is strictly increasing in k given that so is θ (k).
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4 Empirical Analysis
Our theoretical model delivers strong implications. It provides a structure in which com-
munities may form stochastic herds of public-good contributions based on the fact that an
individual expects many others in the community to contribute, and this expectation en-
hances the individual’s perceived expected benefit from themselves contributing. It is also
true, however, that our model is fairly stylized, hinging heavily on the premise that total,
community-wide contributions for the production of the public good are sufficiently large.
More precisely, we require that either the total number or the average size of individual con-
tributions are sufficiently large. These conditions, which are duals of one another, presuppose
that the community under study is either sufficiently numerous or else willing and able to
contribute sufficiently large amounts to the public good. Because of this, a complementary,
non-structural, empirical investigation is required.
4.1 Data
The empirical portion of our analysis made use of two data sets: the 2004-2007 Septem-
ber supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS), and the Census 2000 Summary
Files (STF3). The CPS and Census files were matched using Core Based Statistical Areas
(CBSA’s) via a county-level matching procedure. Geographic information after the match
was retained for the CBSA level of analysis and may be more properly considered as the
“CBSA-area” level of analysis.9 An additional, and easily met, restriction which we used
was that at least 10 individuals had to be found in the CBSA-area within our sample.
The CPS September supplement is unique with respect to other CPS supplements in its
focus on questions related to individual volunteering. It contains information on individual-
level demographic characteristics as well as indicators for whether an individual chose to
9At first, we attempted to match the two datasets entirely at the county level using county of residence
information in the CPS. This strategy was abandoned due to the large number of individuals for whom county
information in the CPS was unavailable. Instead, we adopted the method of matching the CBSA of residence
in the CPS data to the corresponding county(ies) in the Census data. This matching technique alleviated
the problem of missing CPS residence information significantly, allowing us to keep a substantially larger
fraction of the data. We use the term “CBSA area” to reflect the fact that we averaged information across
all counties within a particular CBSA. Unfortunately, in order to maintain consistency of measurements
for the merged years, we had to focus only on the years 2004-2007, as these are the ones for which CBSA
information is available in the CPS. The 2002-2003 September Volunteering Supplements do have county
and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) information, however, they do not provide information on CBSA
of residence, since CBSA was not yet in use at that time in the supplements. It should also be noted that
county information was generally unavailable for the CPS observations in the New England states. For these
states, a New England City and Town Area (NECTA) to CBSA match was virtually impossible since there
is a many-to-many relationship between NECTA’s and CBSA’s, even before accounting for county locations.
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volunteer, along with the type of volunteer organization that was chosen. Our analysis
focused on working-age adults (ages 25 to 65). We used this restriction because, as Mutchler
et.al. [40] pointed out, it is possible that retirees or students volunteer for different reasons
than do individuals currently in the workforce.10 Regarding its time span, our baseline
analysis focused primarily on the last two years of our data (2006-2007). These two years
were used in the baseline regressions in order to make the time frame comparable between the
baseline and the instrumental variables regressions. The instrumental variables regression,
by their nature, employed all four years of data in the analysis.11
The CPS information employed in our empirical investigation included individual-level
demographic characteristics and information on whether an individual chose to volunteer, as
well as the type of organization for which he or she chose to volunteer. Specifically, from the
CPS data, we used information on an individual’s gender, age, race, educational attainment,
family income, family structure and size, as well as marital and employment status.12 These
variables will henceforth be collectively referred to as DEMOG. Also from the CPS data
set, we imported a binary variable denoting whether or not an individual volunteered, and
noted also the particular organizations for which he or she volunteered, paying particular
attention to whether or not he or she volunteered for a religious organization.13 Our empirical
analysis did not employ the number of hours volunteered. This dimension of an individual’s
contribution decision is not captured by our theoretical structure and, to maintain rigor and
consistency, our empirical investigation stays as much as is possible within the limits of our
theoretical intuition. Specifically, the extensive, rather than intensive, margin poses more
interest for our particular theoretical analysis.
Our intuition for including the DEMOG control characteristics in our analysis is sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the literature. We next consider a few of these points,
although this list is far from exhaustive in nature. Gender: It has been documented that,
on average, females volunteer more and are thought to be differentially altruistic, at least in
some settings, than males (Simmons and Emanuele [45]). Wealth and Education: These are
considered to be intimately associated with an individual’s likelihood of being civic-minded
10Further analyses showed similar results (available upon request) for the full population of individuals
aged 15 and older.
11Employing the larger four-year sample in the baseline regressions did not change the substance of our
results.
12To proxy family structure, we employed variables indicating the presence of children of various ages in
the home, as well as marital status. The variables used to depict marital status are coded as: never married,
married and spouse present, married and spouse absent, and divorced or separated.
13More precisely, we used the responses to the question in the survey asking about the organization for
which the individual had volunteered. Answering that one had volunteered but not for a religious organization
renders one a “nonreligious” volunteer.
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and engaging in volunteer activities (Dee [21]). Family Structure and Size: Individuals with
children, and in particular small children, are more likely to volunteer, at least for some
types of organizations. Employment Status: This characteristic is important because of the
possibility that individuals are either trading off volunteering with paid work in an effort to
increase human capital or life satisfaction or instead, according to average statistics, such as
in Kulik [34], the employed are also volunteering at higher rates. Race: This variable is often
implicated as affecting not only the choice of volunteering but also the type of the chosen
volunteer activity. This effect is especially strong in studies of religious volunteering, such
as in Musick et.al. [39].
From the Census data, we gathered information on the average characteristics of the
CBSA area. Specifically, we included as controls the total population size (and its square),
the average CPI-adjusted income level (and its square), and the fraction living in an urban
location in the CBSA area.14 We also employed the fraction of various racial groups in the
CBSA-area as part of the area-level controls. In what follows, these location-related variables
will be collectively referred to as CBSACHAR.15
Finally, regarding the average level of volunteering in the community, we created several
CBSA-area measures of this variable. We note that these measures of average volunteering in
the community correspond to the focal variable of our theoretical analysis (the number k of
contributions from others adjusted for community size). We created the average (leave-out-
mean) of individuals volunteering “generally,” i.e. religious or non-religious, using current
year data, and, alternatively, using a two-year lagged version. We repeated this construction
of the average, as well as the two-year lag, for both the specific type of volunteering, which we
considered “religious” i.e. volunteering for religious organizations, as well as for volunteering
which was “non-religious” in nature. We chose a two-year lag as our time-frame for several
reasons. First, we wanted to employ a measure which did not confound the effects from
repeated observation from the outgoing rotation groups in the CPS, and second, we wanted
to use a lag which was plausible as an instrumental variable strategy but retained more than
14We used variants of our fraction urbanized vs. total population size and found no substantive difference
from including both in the regressions. We chose to include both population size and fraction urbanized so
that we could distinguish larger areas from simply different types of areas by urban-rural distinction.
15We experimented with regression specifications including measures of fractionalization (by race, immi-
grant, and income inequality using Gini coefficients) at the CBSA area-level as control variables. These were
constructed in the same way as the ethno-linguistic type of fractionalization measures. Empirically, these
required a slightly less favored measure of race for the individual-level, since our probit models using the
same racial structure as in this analysis did not achieve numerical convergence. Nevertheless, also in these
alternative race-coded models, the average level of volunteering in the community has a positive effect on
an individual’s decision to volunteer, both in the baseline OLS/probit regressions as well as in their respec-
tive instrumented versions. This was true with respect to both general volunteering and for non-religious
volunteering. Notice that general volunteering includes both religious and non-religious volunteering.
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a single year of data for the present analysis.16 17
Summary Statistics
Table 1 displays the mean, minimum, and maximum of each variable in our analysis for the
full population of individuals in the CPS September Supplement Files (2004-2007).18 Means
are shown for the 2004-2007 merged-year sample as well as separately by each of the four
included years. Annual results are quite similar to the merged-year results, albeit with a
few exceptions. In particular, the fraction of individuals with a family income above $75,000
varies from a low of 29% in 2004 to a high of 35% in 2007.19 Variation over time is also
present in the fraction who volunteer, going from a high of 30% in 2004 to a low of 27% in
2007. We feel that there may have been a break in volunteer activities with a greater number
of individuals choosing to volunteer at the beginning of the 2004-2007 period due to outside
environmental factors. There is also some small variation in the composition of individuals
based on education level and age. Overall, however, the similarities in the summary statistics
of our sample over the relevant time period are such that they do not point to any significant
biases in the data.
Table 2 displays the breakdown of volunteering by category among the individuals who
chose to volunteer. 20 It is clear from this table that volunteering for religious organizations,
16See for example Isham et.al. [32], Tao and Yeh [48], and Segal et.al. [44].
17In our theoretical model, we assume that once an individual decides to volunteer his or her time for a
common good or cause, the amount of time which is offered is exogenously given. Although the intensive
margin is obviously important, we have chosen not to focus on it because it depends on factors such as
the opportunity cost of one’s time as one example. The concern is that these types of factors may not be
directly related to information regarding the quality of the public good or the importance of the volunteer
cause. Within our theoretical framework, this information in particular is what helps us discern the positive
relationship between average community levels of volunteering as affecting individual choices to volunteer.
Therefore, we have chosen to focus on the extensive, rather than the intensive margin, in order to allow the
theoretical and empirical aspects of the analysis to retain a closer compatibility.
18The regressions in Tables 3-5 and Appendix Tables 1-2 refer to an age-restricted sample (age 25-65). We
chose to focus on the full sample in this table in order to show generality in the reported results. It is also
true, however, that the age-restricted sample shows a similar pattern of results to those shown in Table 1.
19Since it was reported in a categorical fashion, individual income data from the CPS files could not
reasonably employ a CPI-adjustment. This partially explains the variation we see over time in the summary
statistics of individual income at the highest brackets. Average area-level income was coded in a continuous
fashion so that a CPI-adjustment was, in principle, a possibility. We were concerned about a lack of
conformity in having the personal income not CPI adjusted and average area-level income CPI-adjusted,
so we ran our regression specifications with and without CPI-adjusted average income in the CBSA area.
The results were not distinguishably different in any way. The effects of income were also similar when our
regressions were run with yearly data rather than using the full sample, further showing little reliance of our
results on the CPI adjustment.
20Of course, there are discrepancies in the percentages for religious volunteering between this table and
the preceding one because the respective ratios use different denominators. Specifically, this table shows the
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children’s educational or sports groups, as well as social and community service is generally
the largest portion of volunteer work in this survey. Together, these three categories account
for between 71% and 76% of the volunteering activities in any year of the sample. The
observed high rate of participation in religious organizational volunteering is an additional
reason for considering this type of volunteer work separately in the regression portion of
our analysis. We note that, despite a few fluctuations, the time period under study is
characterized by a relatively constant flow of volunteer work by type of activity.21
4.2 Regression Analysis
The primary goal of our empirical investigation was to determine the effect of average vol-
unteering by others on one’s probability of engaging in volunteer work. We additionally
accounted for other factors at the individual and area-level of analysis which may affect
one’s volunteering decision. The general specification for individual i in CBSA area j is:
V OLi,j = f (DEMOGi, CBSACHARj, AV GV OLj)
where V OLi,j, DEMOGi, CBSACHARj, and AV GV OLj depict, respectively, the individ-
ual’s binary decision of whether or not to volunteer, individual demographic characteristics,
community characteristics of the CBSA-area, and the average level of volunteering in that
area. We also note that when V OLi,j is “general” volunteering, AV GV OLj measures aver-
age “general” volunteering in the area. Similarly, when V OLi,j is non-religious volunteering,
AV GV OLjmeasures average non-religious volunteering in the area.
The Baseline Probit-model Structure
We instantiate this general model with a probit structure (and a differenced probit for
marginal effects). Specifically, we view each individual as having some inherent desire to
volunteer and actually doing so once this desire exceeds an unknown threshold α. This can
be represented with a latent variable structure where V OL∗i,j and V OLi,j are, respectively,
the latent desire to volunteer, and the observed decision of whether or not to do so. Formally,
we estimate the specification
percentage who do volunteer work of a particular type, using, as the denominator representations of different
types of volunteering in the community. In contrast, Table 1 uses the full population as the denominator.
21Notice that changes in the identification of volunteering organizations over time (the inclusion of immi-
gration volunteering being one of the most important) altered the way these questions are coded. This is
why an “other” category is missing from our 2007 data and explains part of the variation by category.
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V OL∗i,j = β0 + β1DEMOGi + β2CBSACHARj + β3AV GV OLj + ǫi,j
V OLi,j =
{
1 if V OL∗i,j > α
0 if V OL∗i,j ≤ α
for some value α. All of our regressions in the baseline and all robustness analyses addi-
tionally include year fixed effects, with robust standard errors clustered on CBSA-area, and
probability weighting for sample inclusion.
Ordinary Least Squares Robustness Test
To further test the robustness of our probit results, we compare them with those from an
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. Namely, for the ith individual in the jth CBSA, our
OLS specification is as follows:
V OLi,j = α0 + α1DEMOGi + α2CBSACHARj + α3AV GV OLj + εi,j
Even though the linearized probability model is clearly an inferior fit compared to the
probit one given a binary dependent variable structure, we present OLS results for reasons of
completeness in our exposition. A more important reason for employing the OLS structure
is due to well-known problems in the use of instrumental variables (IV) analysis for binary
dependent variables. Employing an OLS structure for the baseline analysis facilitates the
ease of comparison with associated linearized instrumental variables regressions which do
not suffer from the aforementioned problems with binary dependent variables.
Instrumental Variables Regressions
In considering the effect of the average volunteering in one’s community on an individual’s
decision to volunteer, two main confounding forces are considered to be of chief concern.
The first regards individuals sorting by personal proclivity into communities with matching
associated volunteering patterns. In particular, endogeneity may arise through the following
mechanism: individuals inclined to volunteer choose to settle in communities where others
are like them and, therefore, choose locations with higher average rates of volunteering. As
a result, observed positive relationships between higher average volunteering rates at the
community-level and individual volunteering may reflect, at least partially, this selective
sorting mechanism. The second issue regards reflection bias. Reflection bias will occur when
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employing the average of the dependent variable in the set of control variables. This issue
will be partially mitigated by the present analysis’s focus on a leave-out mean. However,
there does remain some concern on the matter and necessitates the use of an alternative
approach.
In order to account for these two types of endogeneity, namely, reflection bias and selec-
tive sorting by community average volunteering, we undertook an IV analysis choosing two
different types of instruments. The two year lagged value of average volunteering was chosen
as an instrument for current average volunteering in the community.22 23 This choice of
instrumentation strategy alleviated concerns regarding reflection bias. To a lesser extent, it
alleviated concerns regarding selective sorting in the case where individuals may have chosen
their communities more recently.
In order to address selective sorting in particular, we used the two year lagged aver-
age of religious volunteering as an instrument for current average nonreligious volunteering.
We chose this because of its posited relevance and excludability. Specifically, the reasoning
behind this second instrumentation strategy was as follows: individuals engaged in nonre-
ligious volunteering may follow the pattern of nonreligious volunteering in the community.
The “religious” level of volunteering, while correlated with other types of (nonreligious) vol-
unteering in the community (i.e. instrument relevance), should not directly influence the
selective sorting of individuals into the community (i.e. excludable instrument). Addition-
ally, the reasons that individuals engage in religious volunteering are quite different compared
to general non-religious types of volunteering.
Both instrumentation strategies were employed in isolation as well as in a multi-instrument
regression strategy. The combined instrumentation strategy, as opposed to the single-
instrument approach, allowed us to test for instrument validity, per the exclusion restriction
using Hansen-J over-identification statistics.24 In this way, the power of the exclusion restric-
tion was addressed through over-identification tests in the multi-instrumentation strategy.25
22We employed a two-year lagged value of the level of average volunteering because of the sampling design
of the CPS. The outgoing rotation group structure had individuals resampled over time so the current
two-year lag strategy alleviated the concern that individuals would show up in the instrument.
23The time-span of our baseline analysis focused primarily on the last two years of our data set (2006-
2007) because of the use of this instrumentation strategy. This allowed us to obtain a comparable time-frame
between the baseline and the instrumental variables regressions. When we employed all four years of data for
the baseline analysis, results were extremely similar to those presented here and are available upon request.
24The Hansen J Statistic was appropriate rather than the Sargan F statistic due to the nature of our
standard errors. The concept, however, is identical.
25We would note the similarity of results using each of the instrumentation strategies in our analysis. Each
of our instruments passes the test of relevance, since first stage F-statistics are well beyond conventional levels
of significance (in the single instrument case, they greatly exceeded the “rule of thumb” of 10. In the multi-
instrument strategy, the Cragg Donald F also showed clear relevance for the set of instruments). While we
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Regression Results
Table 3 displays the effect of average levels of volunteering in the CBSA on an individual’s
likelihood of engaging in volunteer work. All regressions in this and later tables employ
controls for year, as well as probability weighting for sample inclusion and robust standard
errors clustered at the CBSA-level. Controls for demographic and local area characteristics
were added into the regressions in a progressive fashion.
Columns 1-3 display results from regressions examining the effect of average (all types)
volunteering on individual volunteering of any type. Columns 4-6 display results from re-
gressions examining the effect of area-level average non-religious volunteering on individual
non-religious volunteering. Averages are taken from the current year relative to the individ-
ual’s decision to volunteer. The results are shown with probit regressions in the top half of
the table and OLS linearized regressions on the bottom half of the table. There are three
regressions for each type of volunteering outcome employed here and, therefore, a total of
twelve regressions shown in this table. Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in brackets.
Marginal probit coefficients are shown in italics below the probit coefficients and above the
associated t-statistics. 26
Table 3 demonstrates a clear positive relationship between average area-level volunteer-
ing and an individual’s decision to volunteer. This relationship is statistically significant at
the 1% level throughout the table. This is true for both the general volunteering as well as
the non-religious volunteering regressions. It is also clear that controlling for measures of
individual and community characteristics, while reducing the effect of average volunteering
(because presumably there will be some relationship between other characteristics of com-
munities and individuals and the volunteering rate), does not manage to entirely erase the
relationship. The coefficient on the average level of volunteering in the community remains
positive and highly significant. Specifically, in the regressions in both columns 3 and 6 which
employ all individual and local-area controls, the magnitude of the relationship between
area-level volunteering and an individual’s decision to volunteer remains statistically signif-
icant at the 1% level.27 In order to determine whether selection and endogeneity drive this
have provided multi-instrument over-identification evidence, we would note that the instruments served very
different purposes in our analysis and, for this reason, it may be argued that individual instrumentation
strategies were more appropriate than the multi-instrument strategy. We note this here as a caveat.
26Controls for individual characteristics, area characteristics and year are included at various points in the
table as explained above. Coefficients on these variables are suppressed due to space constraints, but are
available upon request.
27A priori, one might have assumed that religious volunteering was more strongly affected by the actions
of one’s peers. As evidenced from this table, at least from a baseline analysis, there is little evidence for this
hypothesis.
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positive relationship, Tables 4 and 5 employ an instrumental variables regression approach.
Table 4 replicates the regression analysis in Table 3, however, in Table 4, only the probit
and associated instrumental variables probit regressions are shown, rather than the additional
OLS regressions shown in Table 3.28 Columns 1-3 of Table 4 once again show the effect of
average (all types) volunteering on individual volunteering of any type, while columns 4-6
examine the effect of area-level average non-religious volunteering on individual non-religious
volunteering. The instrument for average current levels of volunteering is the two year lag
of this same measure.
Table 4 once again demonstrates a positive relationship between average volunteering in
the area and an individual’s decision to volunteer. This is true for both the general type of
volunteering as well as for non-religious volunteering.29 Appendix Table 1 further confirms
this positive relationship between average area-level and individual volunteering by using the
same general setup as in Table 4 but employing a linearized instrumental variables regression
rather than a probit structure.
In both Tables 4 and Appendix Table 1, it is clear that the coefficients on average area-
level volunteering are somewhat larger and display smaller t-statistics in the instrumented,
relative to the baseline, probit regressions. The decrease in t-statistics is to be expected be-
cause we are using an instrumental variables approach while the increase in the magnitude of
coefficients shows evidence that we may indeed see some problems of bias in our initial base-
line regression relationships. Specifically, these increased coefficients in the instrumented,
relative to the baseline, regressions point to an underestimation of the true positive effect
of average on individual levels of volunteering. We find additional evidence for endogeneity
in our baseline relationship from the chi-squared for the IVPROBIT regressions, which tests
for exogeneity and rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity at the 1% level.
In addition to employing an instrumental variables structure designed chiefly to address
reflection bias, i.e. the two-year lagged values of average volunteering and non-religious
volunteering as instruments for their respective current values which was just described,
we also examined an instrumentation strategy designed to address endogeneity arising from
selective sorting on location. Results from this additional instrumentation strategy, shown
in Table 5, verify the same pattern of evidence indicating a clear positive effect of average
area-level volunteering on the individual volunteering choice.
In Table 5, due to the nature of the instrument, only the outcome of individual non-
28The top half of Table 4 is a replica of the bottom half of Table 3, allowing for a direct comparison of the
baseline and instrumental variables probit regressions.
29The effect of community volunteering on individual decisions appears stronger when examining non-
religious volunteering rather than when examining volunteering more generally. This result is not robust to
other regression specifications, however, so we do not over-interpret the importance of this particular result.
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religious volunteering is examined. To facilitate comparison with results from our previous
instrumentation strategy, columns 1-3 redisplay the instrumental variables regression results
available from Table 4 (IVPROBIT) and Appendix Table 1 (IVREG) in the top and bot-
tom halves of the table, respectively. Columns 4-6 depict the results from employing the
new instrumental variables strategy, where the average two-year lagged value of religious
volunteering is used as an instrument for average current values of non-religious volunteer-
ing. Columns 7-9 examine effects from including both instruments in a joint specification
structure. It is evident from this table that regardless of the instrumental variables chosen
or the underlying structural model, average volunteering in the area causes an increase in
individual volunteering rates. Specifically, throughout the table, the effect of average volun-
teering on individual volunteering choices is positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level.
Appendix Table 2 supplies empirical evidence for the relevance and validity of each of
our chosen instruments. Once again, controls for individual and area-level characteristics
are added into the regression in a progressive fashion so that the third column includes all
relevant control characteristics necessary in a first stage regression. The four specifications
shown in this table are, moving down vertically:
• 1. Outcome is the area “general” average volunteering, associated instrument is the
2-year lag of “general” average volunteering
• 2. Outcome is the area non-religious average volunteering, associated instrument is the
2-year lag of non-religious average volunteering
• 3. Outcome is the area non-religious average volunteering, associated instrument is the
2-year lag of religious average volunteering
• 4. Outcome is the area non-religious average volunteering, associated instruments are
both the 2-year lag of religious average volunteering, and the 2-year lag of non-religious
average volunteering.
In terms of instrument relevance, we can rule out weak instruments in each of specifications
(1)-(3) above using the single-instrument rule-of-thumb threshold that our F-statistic exceeds
10. In the fourth and final specification in this table where two instruments are present, we
consult the Cragg-Donald F-Statistic to determine instrument strength. The Cragg-Donald
F of 27.25 in the fully-controlled regression with the associated p-value of 0.000 allows us to
comfortably reject the null hypothesis of joint instrument irrelevance (i.e. weak instruments).
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More importantly perhaps, the p-value of the Hansen J-Statistic is 0.53062 in this fourth
specification. Clearly then we have provided some evidence for validity with this result, since
we have no evidence supporting a failure of our instruments to conform to the exclusion
restriction.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this analysis, we have improved upon the existing literature’s understanding of how social
interactions impact individual decision making in the context of volunteering for a public
good. We have done so through the use of a coordination-game framework. More specifically,
we have constructed a framework in which individual pro-social behavior is a function of the
expected actions of other community members, not only due to specific community charac-
teristics or intra-community relationships, but, more importantly, because of the underlying
coordination required to realize communal goals.
Our paper is, therefore, a step forward in helping us to understand how the volunteering
of individuals in the community as a whole affects the choice of whether or not any specific
individual will volunteer. Our analytical examination has highlighted the importance of
the community-wide level of volunteering as a stochastic coordination device to help people
decide whether or not they will individually choose to volunteer. Our theoretical model
predicted that, given his or her private information about the benefits of volunteering, an
individual will choose to volunteer with higher probability when the level of volunteering in
his or her community is also higher.
We substantiated our theoretical prediction with a complementary, and more general,
empirical analysis. We found clear evidence for the positive relationship asserted in our
theoretical model between the individual likelihood of volunteering and community levels of
volunteering. The empirical analysis employed Census 2000 Summary File data geograph-
ically matched with CPS September Supplement data for the years 2004-2007 providing
the largest and most representative current dataset on volunteering. Our baseline analysis,
as well as a series of robustness checks employing various empirical specifications, verified
our theoretical prediction. Our results were similar regardless of whether we used a probit
or linearized regression, and we argued for a causal interpretation of results based on the
statistical analysis of our instrumental variables regressions.
Taken together, our analysis has provided a clearer understanding of the relationship
between individual volunteering and the volunteering of others. We have documented our
results theoretically and substantiated, using a unique instrumental variables strategy, a
24
more general version empirically. Our empirical analysis has also made a contribution in
providing rigorous statistical testing of the stated relationships using a unique choice of
instrumental variables in a representative dataset.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
For the given utility difference, we have
∆U (w, k) = U (w − x, h ((k + 1) x))− U (w − x, h (kx))− [U (w, h (kx))− U (w − x, h (kx))]
=
ˆ x
0
U2 (w − x, h (kx+ z))h
′ (kx+ z) dz −
ˆ 0
−x
U1 (w + z˜, h (kx)) dz˜
=
ˆ x
0
[U2 (w − x, h (kx+ z))h
′ (kx+ z)− U1 (w − x+ z, h (kx))] dz
≥
ˆ x
0
[U2 (w − x, h (kx))h
′ (kx)− U1 (w − x, h (kx))] dz
= [U2 (w − x, h (kx))h
′ (kx)− U1 (w − x, h (kx))] x
Here, the second and last equalities above apply the fundamental theorem of calculus, while
the third follows from a change of variables in the second integral. By contrast, the inequal-
ity is due to Assumption A.1(iii). Given this result, the claim follows immediately from
Assumption A.2(ii). 
Proof of Proposition 2
Since
exp
(
−
(
(θn − θ0)
2
2σ2ǫ
+
(θ0 − ϑ)
2
2σ2
))
= exp
(
−
(θ0 − µ (θn))
2
2σ2n
+ ξ (θn)
)
where
σ2n =
σ2ǫσ
2
σ2ǫ + σ
2
, µ (θn) =
θnσ
2 + ϑσ2ǫ
σ2ǫ + σ
2
, and ξ (θn) =
µ (θn)
2
2σ2n
−
θ2n
2σ2ǫ
−
ϑ2
2σ2
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we ought to have
δ (θn, k) =
´ ln kx
−∞ e
−
(
(θn−θ0)
2
2σ2ǫ
+
(θ0−ϑ)
2
2σ2
)
dθ0
´ +∞
ln kx
e
−
(
(θn−θ0)
2
2σ2ǫ
+
(θ0−ϑ)
2
2σ2
)
dθ0
=
´ ln kx
−∞ e
− (θ0−µ(θn))
2
2σ2n dθ0
´ +∞
ln kx
e
− (θ0−µ(θn))2
2σ2n dθ0
=
´ ln kx−µ(θn)√σ2n
−∞ e
− θ˜2
2 dθ˜´ +∞
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
e−
θ˜2
2 dθ˜
=
Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
)
1− Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
)
The claim now follows from the fact that µ′ (θn) = σ
2
σ2ǫ+σ
2 > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1
The if direction is trivial. By hypothesis, given an arbitrary ε > 0, there exists k2 ∈ N s.t.
for all k ≥ k2
−ε ≤ V (θn, k) < V (θn, k) + f (θn, k)
where the second inequality is true since f (θn, k) > 0 for all (θn, k) ∈ R × N. The result
immediately follows and we may in fact take k1 = k2.
For the only if direction, we will make use of an intermediary result.
Lemma 2 Consider the function f : R×N 7→ R++ defined by f (θn, k) =
Pr[kx≤eθ≤(k+1)x|θn,k]
Pr[eθ≤kx|θn,k] .
For any given θn ∈ R, the following hold
• (i) limk→+∞ f (θn, k) = 0
• (ii) f1 (θn, k) > 0 for any k ∈ N s.t. k ≥ e
µ(θn)/x
Proof. Part (i) is trivial.30 For (ii), fix the signal θn and recall the various likelihoods we
have defined in the main text. Since
f (θn, k) =
Pr
[
kx ≤ eθ0 ≤ (k + 1) x|θn, k
]
Pr [eθ0 ≤ kx|θn, k]
=
Pr
[
k|θn, kx ≤ e
θ0 ≤ (k + 1) x
]
Pr
[
θn, kx ≤ e
θ0 ≤ (k + 1) x
]
Pr [k|θn, eθ0 ≤ kx] Pr [θn, eθ0 ≤ kx]
30Obviously, the events {θ0 ∈ R : ln kx ≤ θ0 ≤ ln (k + 1)x} and {θ0 ∈ R : θ0 ≤ ln (k + 1)x} become, re-
spectively, arbitrarily small and large as k → +∞. And as the random variable θ0 is continuous, so are
the nominator and denominator of f (θn, k). That is, the nominator [resp. denominator] of f (θn, k) gets
arbitrarily small [resp. close to 1] as k → +∞.
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under the hypothesized typical response rule, we may also define
Pr
[
k|θn, kx ≤ e
θ0 ≤ (k + 1) x
]
= H (θ (k) , k)N−k−1 H˜ (θ (k) , k)k
where
H (θ (k) , k) = Pr
[
θn > θ (k) |kx ≤ e
θ0 ≤ (k + 1) x
]
H˜ (θ (k) , k) = Pr
[
θn ≤ θ (k) |kx ≤ e
θ0 ≤ (k + 1) x
]
and write
f (θn, k)
A˜ (θ (k) , k)N−k−1 B˜ (θ (k) , k)k
=
Pr
[
θn, kx ≤ e
θ0 ≤ (k + 1) x
]
Pr [θn, eθ0 ≤ kx]
=
Φ
(
ln(k+1)x−µ(θn)√
σ2n
)
Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
) − 1
where
A˜ (θ (k) , k) =
H (θ (k) , k)
F (θ (k) , k)
B˜ (θ (k) , k) =
H˜ (θ (k) , k)
F˜ (θ (k) , k)
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Hence,
f1 (θn, k)
A˜ (θ (k) , k)N−k−1 B˜ (θ (k) , k)k
=
µ′ (θn)√
σ2nΦ
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ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
)
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φ
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σ2n
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√
σ2nΦ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
) [1− e− (ln(k+1)x−µ(θn))2−(ln kx−µ(θn))22πσ2n ]
=
µ′ (θn)φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
)
√
σ2nΦ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
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) [1− e−(ln k(k+1)x2−2µ(θn)) ln( k+1k )2πσ2n ]
and the hypothesis ensures that the last bracketed quantity above is positive. 
We are now in a position to establish the only if part of the proposition. By hypothesis, for
an arbitrary ε > 0, there will be some k1 ∈ N, such that
V (θn, k) ≥ −
[ε
2
+ f (θn, k)
]
≥ −
[ε
2
+ f (θ0 + c, k)
]
for all k ≥ k˜ = max
{
k1, e
µ(θ0+c)/x
}
. Here, the second inequality is due to part (ii) of
the preceding lemma. The result follows since part (i) of the lemma ensures that for some
k (θ0 + c) ∈ N and for all k ≥ k2 = max
{
k˜, k (θ0 + c)
}
the quantity f (θ0 + c, k) will be
smaller than ε/2. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1 With respect to the left-hand side of (3), U (w − x, h ((k + 1) x)) is increasing in
k given assumptions A.1(ii) and A.2(i). The same type of monotonicity, moreover, also
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characterizes the utility difference ∆U (w, x, k) since, for any k, k′ ∈ N with k′ > k, we get
∆U (w, x, k) =
ˆ x
0
(U2 (w − x, h (kx+ z)) f
′ (kx+ z)− U1 (w − x+ z, h (kx))) dz
≤
ˆ x
0
(U2 (w − x, h (kx+ z)) f
′ (k′x+ z)− U1 (w − x+ z, h (k′x))) dz
= ∆U (w, x, k′)
the inequality being due to assumptions A.1(iii) and A.2(iii). For sufficiently large k, there-
fore, the quantity of interest is non-increasing with respect to the number of contributions.
Step 2 The right-hand side of (3), on the other hand, has the following total differential with
respect to k
δ2 (θ (k) , k)A (θ (k) , k)
N−k−1B (θ (λ) , k)k
+ δ (θ (k) , k)
∂
∂k
(
A (θ (k) , k)N−k−1B (θ (λ) , k)k
)
(4)
+ θ′ (k)
 δ1 (θ (k) , k)A (θ (k) , k)
N−k−1B (θ (λ) , k)k
+δ (θ (k) , k) (N − k)A (θ (k) , k)N−k−1A1 (θ (k) , k)B (θ (λ) , k)
k
+δ (θ (k) , k)A (θ (k) , k)N−k−1 kB1 (θ (λ) , k)
k−2

Step 2.1(i) We will begin by showing that the first two terms in (4) sum to a positive number.
The first term is always positive by itself since
δ2 (θ, k) =
φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
)
δ (θ, k)
Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
)(
1− Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
)) > 0 (5)
Step 2.1(ii) With respect to the second term, we have
A (θ, k + 1)N−k−2B (θ, k + 1)k+1
A (θ, k)N−k−1B (θ, k)k
=
(
A (θ, k + 1)
A (θ, k)
)N−1 (B(θ,k+1)
A(θ,k+1)
)k+1
(
B(θ,k)
A(θ,k)
)k (6)
and, given the following result,
Lemma 3 Let γ, x0, y0, and s be reals with the latter one non-zero. Let also x ∼ N (x0, s
2)
and y ∼ N (y0, s
2). Then, x0 < y0 only if Pr [x ≥ γ] < Pr [y ≥ γ].
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Proof. Since
Pr [x ≥ γ] =
ˆ +∞
γ
e−
(x−x0)
2
2s2 dx =
1
√
2s2
ˆ +∞
γ−x0√
s2
e−
x˜2
2 dx˜ =
1− Φ
(
γ−x0√
s2
)
√
2s2
the claim follows immediately from the fact that Φ
(
γ−x√
s2
)
is strictly decreasing in x. 
it must be
A (θ, k) =
Pr
[
θn > θ (k) |e
θ0 ≤ kx
]
Pr [θn > θ (k) |eθ0 > kx]
< 1 <
Pr
[
θn ≤ θ (k) |e
θ0 ≤ kx
]
Pr [θn ≤ θ (k) |eθ0 > kx]
= B (θ, k) (7)
Therefore,
A (θ, k + 1)N−k−2B (θ, k + 1)k+1
A (θ, k)N−k−1B (θ, k)k
>
(
B (θ, k + 1)
A (θ, k + 1)
)k+1
/
(
B (θ, k)
A (θ, k)
)k
(8)
and to show that the second term in (4) is positive for sufficiently large k it is enough to
establish that the right-hand side of this inequality tends to 1 as k → +∞.
To this end, observe that
B (θ, k) =
Pr
[
θn < θ, e
θ0 ≤ kx
]
Pr [θn < θ, eθ0 > kx]
Pr
[
eθ0 > kx
]
Pr [eθ0 ≤ kx]
=
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´ ln kx
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with
∂
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ˆ θ
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2
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and
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By L’Hoˆpital’s rule, therefore, either ratio in the product defining B (θ, k) above converges
to −1 as k → +∞. In other words, limk→+∞B (θ, k) = 1 and a trivially similar argument
shows that limk→+∞A (θ, k) = 1 as well.
Notice also that
A2 (θ, k) =
G2 (θ, k)
G (θ, k)
(
F2 (θ, k)
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)
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]
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and where, abusing notation slightly, we meant to denote
Pr
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eθ0 = kx
]
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√
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√
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Pr
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ˆ ln kx+c
θ
e
− (θn−ln kx)2
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Similarly,
B2 (θ, k) = −
G˜2 (θ, k)
G˜ (θ, k)
(
F˜2 (θ, k)
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It is now straightforward to check the following: On the one hand, limk→+∞
A2(θ,k)
A(θ,k)
−
B2(θ,k)
B(θ,k)
=
0. On the other hand, due to the property of the normal distribution we observed previously,
F2 (θ, k) > 0 while G2 (θ, k) < 0. That is, A2 (θ, k) > 0 and, by a similar analysis, F˜2 (θ, k) <
0 < G˜2 (θ, k) and B2 (θ, k) < 0.
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To complete the argument, consider the sequence
{
αk =
(
A(θ,k)
B(θ,k)
)k}
k∈N∗
. Under (7), it must
be αk ∈ (0, 1) for all k. By the mean value theorem, moreover,
αk+1
αk
− 1 = ln
(
A (θ, κ)
B (θ, κ)
)
+ κ
(
A2 (θ, κ)
A (θ, κ)
−
B2 (θ, κ)
B (θ, κ)
)
> ln
(
A (θ, κ)
B (θ, κ)
)
+
A2 (θ, κ)
A (θ, κ)
−
B2 (θ, κ)
B (θ, κ)
for some κ ∈ (k, k + 1). And since the last quantity above vanishes as k → +∞, it must be
limk→+∞
αk+1
αk
= 1+.31 This means that the right-hand side of (8) converges to 1−. Which in
turn suffices to ensure that the sum of the first two terms in (4) is positive since successive
applications of L’Hopital’s rule give
lim
k→+∞
δ2 (θ, k) = lim
k→+∞
φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
)
(
1− Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
))2 = lim
k→+∞
k−1 (ln kx− µ (θn))
2σ2n
(
1− Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
))
= lim
k→+∞
k−2 (ln kx− µ (θn)− 1)
2σ2nφ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
) = +∞
Step 2.2 Next, we determine the sign of the bracketed quantity in the last term of (4). In
Proposition 2, we have already established that δ1 (θ, k) < 0. Moreover,
A1 (θ, k) =
G1 (θ, k)
G (θ, k)
(
F1 (θ, k)
G1 (θ, k)
− A (θ, k)
)
where
F1 (θ, k) =
∂
∂θ
(
Pr
[
θn ≥ θ, e
θ0 ≤ kx
]
Pr [eθ0 ≤ kx]
)
= −
Pr
[
θn = θ, e
θ0 ≤ kx
]
Pr [eθ0 ≤ kx]
= −
Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θ)√
σ2n
)
Φ
(
ln kx−ϑ√
σ2
)
31More precisely, we just established that, taking a subsequence if necessary, {αk} becomes non-decreasing.
As it is also bounded, it must converge to some l ∈ (0, 1].
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and, similarly, G1 (θ, k) = −
1−Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θ)√
σ2n
)
1−Φ
(
ln kx−ϑ√
σ2
) . Hence,
F1 (θ, k)
G1 (θ, k)
=
Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θ)√
σ2n
)
1− Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θ)√
σ2n
) 1− Φ
(
ln kx−ϑ√
σ2
)
Φ
(
ln kx−ϑ√
σ2
)
and since
A (θ, k) =
´ c
θ
Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
)
eξ(θn)dθn
´ c
θ
[
1− Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
)]
eξ(θn)dθn
1− Φ
(
ln kx−ϑ√
σ2
)
Φ
(
ln kx−ϑ√
σ2
)
it ought to be
A (θ, k)
F1 (θ, k) /G1 (θ, k)
=
ˆ c
θ
Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
)
Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θ)√
σ2n
) eξ(θn)dθn/ ˆ c
θ
1− Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θn)√
σ2n
)
1− Φ
(
ln kx−µ(θ)√
σ2n
) eξ(θn)dθn
< 1
where the inequality is due to the fact that Φ
(
ln kx−µ(·)√
σ2n
)
is decreasing. We therefore conclude
that A1 (θ, k) < 0. Similarly,
B1 (θ, k) = −
G1 (θ, k)
1− Pr [eθ0 ≤ kx]−G (θ, k)
(
F1 (θ, k)
G1 (θ, k)
− B (θ, k)
)
but
B (θ, k) =
Pr [θn ≥ θ, θ < kx]
Pr [θn ≥ θ, θ ≥ kx]
Pr [θ ≥ kx]
Pr [θ < kx]
=
´ θ
−cΦ
(
kx−µ(θn)
σ2
)
eξ(θn)dθn
´ θ
−c
[
1− Φ
(
kx−µ(θn)
σ2
)]
eξ(θn)dθn
Pr [θ ≥ kx]
Pr [θ < kx]
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and, thus,
B (θ, k)
F1 (θ, k) /G1 (θ, k)
=
ˆ θ
−c
Φ
(
kx−µ(θn)
σ2
)
Φ
(
kx−µ(θ)
σ2
) eξ(θn)dθn/ ˆ θ
−c
1− Φ
(
kx−µ(θn)
σ2
)
1− Φ
(
kx−µ(θ)
σ2
) eξ(θn)dθn
> 1
Since, therefore, B1 (θ, k) < 0 as well, the bracketed quantity in question is clearly negative.
Step 3 Recall once again the defining equation for the cut-off θ (k). Since for sufficiently
large k its left-hand side is non-increasing with k, the implicit function theorem dictates
that the total differential of its right-hand side with respect to k ought to be non-positive.
This differential is given by (4), however, and we just showed that, as k → +∞, its first two
terms are positive whereas the bracketed part of its last term is negative. Hence, for large
enough k, it cannot help but be the case that θ′ (k) > 0 as required. 
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